“There are two ways of spreading light: to be the candle or the mirror that reflects it.” - Edith Wharton

Saturday, November 29, 2008

Haste, Scorned: Blogging at a Snail’s Pace


WHEN Barbara Ganley wants to collect her thoughts, she walks in the Vermont countryside, wanders home and blogs about it. In a recent post, she wrote about the icy impressions left in the snow by sleeping deer. In another, she said she wanted to commute by bicycle and do more composting.

If her blog, bgblogging.wordpress.com, sounds slow and meandering, it is. But that’s the point. Ms. Ganley, 51, is part of a small, quirky movement called slow blogging.

The practice is inspired by the slow food movement, which says that fast food is destroying local traditions and healthy eating habits. Slow food advocates, like the chef Alice Waters of Chez Panisse in Berkeley, Calif., believe that food should be local, organic and seasonal; slow bloggers believe that news-driven blogs like TechCrunch and Gawker are the equivalent of fast food restaurants — great for occasional consumption, but not enough to guarantee human sustenance over the longer haul.

A Slow Blog Manifesto, written in 2006 by Todd Sieling, a technology consultant from Vancouver, British Columbia, laid out the movement’s tenets. “Slow Blogging is a rejection of immediacy,” he wrote. “It is an affirmation that not all things worth reading are written quickly.” (Nor, because of a lack of traffic, is Mr. Sieling writing this blog at all these days.) Ms. Ganley, who recently left her job as a writing instructor at Middlebury College, compares slow blogging to meditation. It’s “being quiet for a moment before you write,” she said, “and not having what you write be the first thing that comes out of your head.”

On her blog, Ms. Ganley juxtaposes images and text as she reflects on the local landscape. She tends to post once or twice a week, but sometimes she can go a month or so without proffering something new.

Some slow bloggers like to push the envelope of their readers’ attention even further. Academics post lengthy pieces about literature and teaching styles, while techies experiment to see how infrequently they can post before readers desert them.

This approach is a deliberate smack at the popular group blogs like Huffington Post, the Daily Beast, Valleywag and boingboing, which can crank out as many as 50 items a day. On those sites, readers flood in and advertisers sign on. Spin and snark abound. Earnest descriptions of the first frost of the season are nowhere to be found.

In between the slow bloggers and the rapid-fire ones, there is a vast middle, hundreds of thousands of writers who are not trying to attract advertising or buzz but do want to reach like-minded colleagues and friends. These people have been the bedrock of the genre since its start, yet recently there has been a sea change in their output: They are increasingly turning to slow blogging, in practice if not in name.

“I’m definitely noticing a drop-off in posting — I’m talking about among the more visible bloggers, the ones with 100 to 200 readers or more,” said Danah Boyd, a doctoral candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, who studies popular culture and technology. “I think that those people who were writing long, thought-out posts are continuing, but those who were writing, ‘Hey, check this out’ posts are going to other forums. It’s a dynamic shift.”

Technology is partly to blame. Two years ago, if a writer wanted to share a link or a video with friends or tell them about an upcoming event, he or she would post the information on a blog. Now it’s much faster to type 140 characters in a Twitter update (also known as a tweet), share pictures on Flickr, or use the news feed on Facebook. By comparison, a traditional blogging program like WordPress can feel downright glacial.

Ms. Ganley, the blogger in Vermont, has a slogan that encapsulates the trend: “Blog to reflect, Tweet to connect.” Blogging, she said, “is that slow place.”

Another reason some bloggers have slowed down is sheer burnout. Siva Vaidhyanathan, a professor at the University of Virginia, shuttered his popular blog, Sivacracy, in September, in part because he was exhausted by the demands. “When you run your own blog, there’s a lot of imaginary pressure to publish constantly, to be witty, to be good, and nobody can live with that,” he said in an interview.

These days, he fires off short, pithy comments on Twitter, but has another blog that he says is “more of a specialized project for in-depth thought.” Here, he shares ideas for an upcoming book, which posits that Google has infiltrated our culture to a worrisome extent.

Andrew Sullivan, perhaps the world’s best-read political blogger, talked about the burnout factor in an article in November’s Atlantic magazine called “Why I Blog.” He said in an interview posted on the magazine’s Web site that during the election, his readers became so addicted to his stream of posts that he sometimes set his blog to post automatically so he could go to lunch. When he took two days off to make sense of “the whole Sarah Palin thing,” his audience flipped, thinking he was dead or silenced.

“You can’t stop,” Mr. Sullivan said in the online interview. “The readers act as if you’ve cut off their oxygen supply, and they just flap around like a goldfish out of water until you plop them back in.”

Slow blogging is something of a philosophical rebuttal to this dynamic. While some bloggers may just be naturally slow — think of the daydreaming schoolmate who used to take forever to get the assignment done — others are more emphatic about the purpose of taking their time.

Russell Davies, a new media consultant in London, has started what may be the ultimate experiment in slow-blogging: Dawdlr. He has turned the instantaneousness of Twitter on its head by asking readers to send him snail-mail postcards answering the question posed to Twitter users, “What are you doing now?” He scans the postcards and puts them up, once every six months, on his site, dawdlr.tumbler.com. A recent postcard contained whimsical line drawings of cats and the words, “Trying not to look back.”

Mr. Davies said his goal was to see if slowing down promoted a greater thoughtfulness. It did, he said, but then again, because Dawdlr is updated so infrequently, few people have heard of it.

“It is an investigation into the Internet’s attention span,” Mr. Davies said by telephone.

Even Mr. Sieling, the writer of the Slow Blog Manifesto, gave up his personal blog because he felt no one was reading it. “I called it the Robinson Crusoe feeling of blogging,” he said by e-mail, “and I think it’s common.”

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Author: JONATHAN MAHLER
Original Source: New York Times
Date Published: November 23, 2008
Web Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/fashion/23slowblog.html
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-30

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The Housing-Bubble and the American Revolution


When Benjamin Franklin returned to America in 1762, after almost five years in London, he was shocked at the housing prices.

“The expence of living is greatly advanc’d in my absence,” he commented. “Rent of old houses, and value of lands ... are trebled in the past six years.”

Franklin, it seems, had come home to a real estate bubble. It eventually popped — bringing on a credit crunch and deep recession that was the macroeconomic backdrop to the American Revolution.

Sound familiar?

The parallels between the current economy and the one Franklin saw highlight a debate among historians: how big a role did economics, as opposed to ideas, play in fomenting revolution?

“I think there’s reason to doubt the Revolution would have happened as it did if it weren’t for these economic conditions,” said Ronald W. Michener, an economics professor at the University of Virginia, in a radical departure from today’s popular notion that the Revolution was a product primarily of grand ideas about self-government.

Gordon S. Wood, a professor at Brown University and perhaps the pre-eminent living historian on the subject, counters: “There was a great deal of instability, but that is hardly an explanation for the Revolution. I don’t think you can make a strong argument for an economic interpretation of the Revolution.”

Professor Michener and his collaborator, Robert W. Wright, a financial historian at New York University, plan to do just that. The tandem worked for several years on a manuscript arguing that the American Revolution was a direct result of the economic malaise that followed the French and Indian War.

Now they have a built-in marketing hook — the current financial crisis — and the publisher, Yale University Press, is hoping to bring the book out as early as next fall. “What I found was that the monetary difficulties faced by the colonies were not very different from modern macroeconomic problems,” Mr. Michener said.

For the colonists, as for us, first came the boom. During the height of the French and Indian War, which lasted from 1754 until 1763, money flooded into the colonies, especially New York, where the British Army was headquartered. At the same time, the New York Legislature issued large numbers of bills of credit.

All that cash sloshing around resulted in lavish displays of wealth — notably by British officers, whose opulent living was emulated by the locals, especially in New York.

Housing prices soared during the war. But when credit tightened afterward — thanks in no small part to a prohibition on the issuance of paper money by the colonies under the Currency Act of 1764 — real estate owners who could not pay their debts lost their land.

John Morton, a sheriff of Chester County in Pennsylvania who would sign the Declaration of Independence, seized 180 farms between 1766 and 1769.

At the core of the Wright-Michener argument is that this confluence of nasty economic circumstances was what produced the anger that found expression in rebellion against the Stamp Act and other British taxes. In other words, the core economic culprit was a boom-bust cycle; convinced that their future was no longer in their hands, the colonists could summon the ghost of John Locke, setting the stage for the arguments of Tom Paine and the Declaration.

Professor Wood argues, in response, that while an individual’s response to the revolutionary cause was partly related to his economic circumstances, democratic ideas had been percolating for years and came to the fore only after specific actions by the British — for example, the Stamp Act, which is widely considered to have triggered the rebellion. And it wasn’t just immediate economic conditions that were ripe: the colonial population was growing faster than the population in Britain, and Franklin foresaw a day when America would be the center of the British Empire. In addition, because property was more easily acquired in the colonies than in Britain, America had a much larger proportion of common citizens, as opposed to nobles, among those entitled to vote.

Of course, economists acknowledge that ideas play a role in history, just as historians of ideas know the narrative has an economic backdrop. These two professors are trying to take back a larger part of the revolutionary story for large-scale economic events in a time when most recent histories have focused on the ideas. “We’re not trying to replace the ideological view,” Professor Wright said. “We’re saying we have an important piece of the puzzle.”

Fashions in history-telling often swing on a pendulum. In 1913, Charles A. Beard wrote his seminal book, “An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,” which presented the founders’ economic self-interest as the principal factor in their commitment to revolution. About a half-century later, Bernard Bailyn, of Harvard, wrote “Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,” setting a benchmark for those who consider ideas to have been the main impulse. Along the way, other histories emphasized the exploits of common people, rather than the titans of history.

But matters macroeconomic — as opposed to mere British tax policies — have not been a dominant part of the narrative in recent years. “You walk into Barnes & Noble and there’s all these great big books on Franklin, Jefferson,” said Edward Countryman, a professor of American history at Southern Methodist University and author of “The American Revolution,” which traces the rebellion to a number of transformative developments, rather than one overriding cause. “By and large these authors are discounting any attempt to take into account social experience.”

Of course, even many historians who focus on the founders’ philosophies — including Professor Wood — say economics and social forces played a role. (Professor Countryman tells his students that trying to pin down Professor Wood is like trying to grab “a trout that is covered in olive oil” because he includes elements of both Beard and Bailyn in his books, even if his overarching view tilts toward ideas.)

“The reigning interpretation right now is ideological,” Professor Wood said. “I think the overall picture is pretty clear right now. But there will always be new generations of historians coming along.”

And a continuing argument, no doubt.

As Professors Wright and Michener see things, had British monetary policy been different, and had the recession been short, the United States might have gained independence only gradually, much as Canada did — over the course of more than a century, beginning in the 1860s.

That is a fun game of “what if,” but for those historians more attuned to ideas, the economic forces at play will always be subservient to the words of Jefferson and Madison.

“We are having a very serious crisis right now,” Professor Wood said, “but no one is talking about revolution.”

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Author: TIM ARANGO
Original Source: New York Times
Date Published: November 30, 2008
Web Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/weekinreview/30arango.html
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-30

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Ahead for Obama: How to Define Terror

WASHINGTON — Early last Tuesday morning, a military charter plane left the airstrip at Guantánamo Bay for Sana, Yemen, carrying Osama bin Laden’s former driver, Salim Hamdan. Once the Bush administration’s poster boy for the war on terror — the first defendant in America’s first military tribunals since World War II — Mr. Hamdan will spend less than a month in a Yemeni prison before returning to his family in Sana, having been acquitted by a jury of United States military officers of the most serious charge brought against him, conspiracy to support terrorism.

The turn of events underscores the central challenge President Obama will face as he begins to define his own approach to fighting terrorism — and the imperative for him to adopt a new, hybrid plan, one that blends elements of both traditional military conflict and criminal justice.

Until now, much of the debate over how best to battle terrorism has centered on the two prevailing — and conflicting — paradigms: Is it a war or a criminal action? The Hamdan case highlights the limitations of such binary thinking. As the verdict in his tribunal this summer made clear, Mr. Hamdan was not a criminal conspirator in the classic sense. Yet, as an aide to the world’s most dangerous terrorist, neither was he a conventional prisoner of war who had simply been captured in the act of defending his nation and was therefore essentially free of guilt.

So how should Americans think about Mr. Hamdan? More broadly, how should they think about the fight against terrorism?

The problems with the war paradigm are by now familiar. Because the war on terror is unlike any other the United States has waged, traditional wartime policies and mechanisms have made for an awkward fit, in some instances undermining efforts to defeat terrorism. The traditional approach to dealing with captured combatants — holding them until the end of hostilities to prevent them from returning to the battlefield — is untenable in a war that could last for generations.

If you treat the fight against terrorism as a war, it’s hard to get around the argument that it’s a war without boundaries; a terrorist could be hiding anywhere. Yet by asserting the right to scoop up suspected terrorists in other sovereign nations and indefinitely detain and interrogate them without hearings or trials, the administration complicated its efforts to build an international coalition against terrorism.

“The war-against-Al-Qaeda paradigm put us in a position where our legal authorities to detain and interrogate didn’t match up with those of our allies, so we ended up building a system that’s often rejected as strategically unsound and legally suspect by even our closest allies,” says Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia who worked on detainee issues in the Bush administration.

Perhaps the most problematic consequence of the war paradigm, though, is that it gave the president enormous powers — as commander in chief — to determine how to detain and interrogate captured combatants. It was the use, or abuse, of those powers that produced the Bush administration’s string of historic rebukes at the Supreme Court, starting in 2004 when the justices ruled in Rasul v. Bush that the president had to afford the Guantánamo detainees some due process.

Some critics of President Bush are now urging President-elect Obama to abandon the war paradigm in favor of a pure criminal-justice approach, which is to say, either subject captured combatants to criminal trials or let them go. This will almost certainly not happen.

Mr. Obama may be more inclined to prosecute suspected terrorists in the federal courts than Mr. Bush has been, and he may even avoid referring to the battle against terrorism as a “war.” But ceding the military paradigm altogether would severely limit his ability to fight terrorism. On a practical level, it would prevent him from operating in a zone like the tribal areas of Pakistan, where American law does not reach.

“If you seriously dialed it back to the criminal-justice apparatus you will paralyze the executive branch’s ability to go where they believe the bad guys are,” says Benjamin Wittes, a fellow at the Brookings Institution. “When people talk about a return to the criminal-justice system, they’re ignoring the geographical limits of that system.”

In fact, the military approach to fighting terrorism predates the Bush administration. After Al Qaeda attacked two American embassies in Africa in 1998, President Clinton launched cruise missiles against terrorist camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan thought to be making chemical weapons. During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama said he would not hesitate to take out terrorist targets in Pakistan — an act of war — if that country’s government was unwilling to do so itself.

Going forward, the fight against terrorism will have to be something of a hybrid. This is a novel idea, as the Constitution lays out only two distinct options: the country is at war, or it is not. Such a strategy may require building new legal systems and institutions for detaining, interrogating and trying detainees.

There has already been talk of creating a national security court within the federal judiciary that would presumably give more flexibility on matters like, say, the standard of proof for evidence collected on an Afghan battlefield. Similarly, it may be necessary to set clear legal guidelines for when the government can detain enemy combatants, and how far C.I.A. agents can go when interrogating terror suspects.

This won’t be easy. It will require striking a balance between the need to preserve and promote America’s rule-of-law values, protect its intelligence gathering and ensure that no one who poses a serious threat is set free.

Such an infrastructure is not likely to survive unchallenged, let alone win popular support, if the executive branch builds it alone. Its chances would be far better with input from Congress, acting as the elected representatives of the people to ensure that any new systems protect both the public and America’s values. And direct advice from the courts could ensure that they are found to be constitutional.

Paradoxically, such an approach might ultimately enhance a president’s power. “We need a strong president to fight this war,” says Jack Goldsmith, a law professor at Harvard who worked in the Bush Justice Department, “and the way to ensure that there’s a strong president is to have the other institutions on board for the actions he feels he needs to take.”

Jonathan Mahler, a contributing writer for The Times Magazine, is the author, most recently, of “The Challenge: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Fight Over Presidential Power.”

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Author: JONATHAN MAHLER
Original Source: New York Times
Date Published: November 30, 2008
Web Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/weekinreview/30mahler.html
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-30

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Garden of Contentment. In a toxic era, a Hangzhou restaurant pursues purity

One day in September, I joined the Chinese restaurateur Dai Jianjun for a foraging expedition on a remote mountainside in Zhejiang Province. Ahead of us, our guide, Bao Laichun, cleared a path, hacking at branches with a bamboo-handled machete. The hawthorn trees around us were heavy with fruit, and, amid bamboo groves and tall grasses, birds and grasshoppers sang, butterflies flitted, and vivid beetles crawled on the ground. It was early in the morning, and the mountaintops were still obscured by mist. “You just can’t trust the ingredients you buy in the markets,” Dai told me, battling his way through the undergrowth. “Vegetables laced with chemicals. Fake birds’ nests held together by glue. Even hairy crabs from Yangcheng Lake—most of them are farmed elsewhere and simply made to ‘take a shower’ in the famous lake before they go to market.” Bao vanished into the undergrowth, reappearing halfway up a pine tree that was swathed in a large-leafed vine. He shook the vine to show us the wild kiwifruits that hung from its stems, and began to slash at it, throwing branches to the ground. We plucked off the walnut-size fruits and filled a basket with them. Then we made our way back to Bao’s farmhouse, stopping occasionally to taste wild chestnuts and grapes, and for Bao to dig a wild-lily bulb out of the earth with his knife.

Dai is the owner of the Dragon Well Manor, a restaurant in Hangzhou, the provincial capital. In an age of industrialization, dire pollution, and frequent food scares, the Dragon Well Manor is committed to offering its guests a kind of prelapsarian Chinese cuisine. Dai assures them that everything he serves will be made from natural ingredients, untainted by pesticides or melamine, and with no added MSG. Each morning, his buyers drive out into the countryside to collect the best of the season’s produce. Often they make several trips in a day: a quick dash to a nearby farm to pick up freshly harvested vegetables; a longer journey to inspect a pig or collect a consignment of eggs; an evening excursion for freshwater fish, shrimp, and eels. At other times, they will drive into the mountains, hike for hours, and then stay overnight before returning to Hangzhou with, say, a batch of wild shiitake mushrooms. Dai accompanies them when he feels like it, partly because he enjoys the outing and partly, as he told me with a mischievous grin, to make sure they don’t cheat him by buying produce in a supermarket.

The Manor has never advertised and steers clear of media attention, but it has a devoted following among Zhejiang’s public figures and wealthy businessmen, who come to unwind on the secluded terraces of its landscaped garden before retiring to a private room for a dinner of seasonal delicacies. Guests can look through the “purchase diary,” a large leather-bound volume containing copies of each day’s contracts with the farmers and artisans who supply the kitchens, along with photographs of them picking vegetables, making rice wine, and slaughtering pigs. Dai has never heard of Chez Panisse or Stone Barns, but he is engaged in a similar mission: to guarantee the integrity of his food supplies while shoring up a dying culinary and agricultural heritage.

Dai, now in his fortieth year, is an affable man with a square brow beneath a dark brush of hair, and a cigarette, as often as not, on the go. He grew up in Hangzhou, the son of a low-ranking Communist Party official and a factory worker. Like many of his generation, he was given a good socialist name, Dai Jianjun (Dai Build-the-Army), though these days everyone calls him by the nickname A Dai. An early interest in food was encouraged by his grandmother. “She instilled in me the idea that cooking was about ben wei, the essential tastes of things,” he told me.

Dai spent six years running a restaurant catering to the Hangzhou tourist trade, made a lot of money, and then decided that he wanted to do something more rewarding. “Originally, I just had the idea of creating a landscaped garden, a beautiful place that would showcase the culture of Hangzhou,” he said. “But I needed to find a way to make it pay for itself, which is why I decided that it could also be a restaurant.”

The Lower Yangtze Region, in which Hangzhou lies, has long been a cultural center. The Song-dynasty poet Su Dongpo served as governor of the city in the eleventh century, and since then the region has been associated with the cultivated life of the Chinese literati, scholar-gentlemen who spent their leisure hours writing poetry and conversing in gardens and teahouses. Hangzhou is one of China’s most attractive cities—Marco Polo described it as “without doubt the finest and most splendid city in the world.” It is particularly renowned for its West Lake, whose shores are framed by hills and ornamented with temples and pagodas.

The wider region, encompassing Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces, is known as yu mi zhi xiang, “land of fish and rice,” for its fertile soil, easy climate, and plentiful produce. From its lakes, rivers, and canals come not only fish but also eels, crab, and shrimp, as well as aquatic vegetables like water bamboo, water chestnut, and lotus. Bamboo grows in the hills, and rice in the paddy fields; other specialties include water shield—an aquatic herb, from Taihu Lake, near the city of Suzhou—and intensely flavored cured ham from Jinhua. In the fall, people come from all over the Chinese mainland to eat the famous hairy crabs of Yangcheng Lake.

The cooking of the Lower Yangtze Region is subtler and more delicate than Sichuanese or Hunanese cuisines, and its character is more difficult to pinpoint. A renowned chef I met in Hangzhou told me, “Our flavors are as varied as the Sichuanese, but they tend to be light and bright, without that heavy spiciness. We emphasize seasonal produce, and the essential tastes of our raw ingredients.” He pointed out that Hangzhou cooking uses comparatively little oil, salt, sugar, or starch—which, he suggested, makes it healthier than other Chinese cuisines— and that it heeds Confucius’ insistence on fine and delicately cut food.

In 2000, Dai started renting a plot of land on the outskirts of Hangzhou. It was a derelict plant nursery with a few shabby buildings and concrete yards, but it lay amid the picturesque tea fields of the district of Longjing, or Dragon Well. He began landscaping the site, but the restaurant itself started in an ad-hoc manner. “It was really more of a hobby than a business,” he said. “We began by inviting people we knew to taste a few things, and then they recommended the place to their friends.”

We were talking over green tea in his study one afternoon. When Dai is not out with his buyers, managing the restaurant, or socializing with his guests, he retreats to this quiet room, which has its own courtyard and a view of the hills, to read and write or play the guqin, an ancient Chinese zither.

After a year, Dai told me, he closed the restaurant for refurbishment. He hired elderly craftsmen to design and plant the garden, and to construct a series of wood-framed buildings in a broadly traditional Hangzhou style. He became preoccupied with the idea of reviving the dishes known by past generations. He had read the work of Yuan Mei, China’s Brillat-Savarin, an eighteenth-century scholar-gentleman who abandoned his career as an imperial bureaucrat to retire to Nanjing, where he designed his own garden and wrote a seminal cookbook, “Food Lists of the Garden of Contentment.” Although, as an educated man, Yuan Mei probably never cooked himself, he was a meticulous gourmet. He recorded his impressions at dinners in grand houses and collected recipes from Buddhist monasteries. He gave his chefs detailed instructions and quizzed them on culinary practice. He had a dislike of flashy cooking, and once wrote of going home hungry after a forty-dish banquet.

Dai decided that his restaurant would have the kind of Hangzhou dishes that Yuan Mei would have enjoyed, prepared with local ingredients according to the theories of Chinese medicine and the solar terms of the old agricultural calendar. He wanted to serve things that are rare in restaurants: “the nourishing soups given to nursing mothers, humble vegetables, cooling dishes to be eaten in the heat of summer.” He told me that Yuan Mei had insisted that the art of cookery began with the selection of the raw ingredients. “He believed that a chef could take credit for only sixty per cent of the success of a banquet, and that whoever did the shopping should take credit for the rest,” Dai said. “He wrote that just as a stupid person would remain stupid even if taught by Confucius and Mencius, a poor ingredient would be tasteless even if cooked by Yi Ya, the legendary Chinese chef of the Zhou dynasty.”

Dai was also influenced by a booklet he had read about scientific advances and the food of the future. “I came to believe that when you change the life cycle of a plant or an animal you end up with something that is barely the same species,” he said. “I decided that my restaurant would use only traditional produce, free from chemicals and genetic modification.”

In early-twenty-first-century China, Dai had set himself an almost impossible task. Gastronomy, like most aspects of Chinese culture, suffered in the Maoist years. Early Communists associated fine dining with the corrupt excesses of the old regime. In 1927, Mao Zedong witnessed peasant associations in Hunan ban the recreational activities of the wealthy, including banqueting. Mao himself had a lifelong dislike of refined and exotic food, preferring the coarse ingredients and robustly spicy flavors of Hunanese peasant cooking. The nationalization of private business, largely completed by 1956, is remembered as the start of a long decline for China’s restaurants. Later, the Cultural Revolution led to a general assault on bourgeois pastimes, including fine dining. Elderly chefs were taunted by their apprentices, and elegant restaurants were instructed to serve “cheap and substantial food” for the masses.

The spread of monosodium glutamate on the Chinese cookery scene, in the nineteen-sixties and seventies, induced further amnesia about some of the core arts of traditional cooking. MSG, which was identified in seaweed in 1908 by a Japanese scientist and launched as a commercial product soon after, became popular in China at a time when food was short, and basic ingredients were rationed. For people unable to afford meat with their rice, MSG—which is known in Chinese as wei jing, “the essence of flavor”—offered a magical shortcut to umami flavors. By the mid-nineties, it had become an inescapable ingredient in professional kitchens, eclipsing the old skills of making stocks from whole fowl, pork ribs, and dried seafood.

The past decade or two have seen other changes in the way Chinese people eat. As recently as the early nineties, many Chinese lived on a diet of fresh seasonal produce bought from street markets. Supermarkets, refrigerators, and processed foods were rare. Since then, urban sprawl has encroached on arable fields; street markets and small restaurants have been swept away as cities are redeveloped; and Western fast-food chains have opened branches all over the country. Meanwhile, firms such as Carrefour and Tesco have persuaded the middle classes to shop in supermarkets, and processed foods have become widely available. And as the Chinese demand more meat, to supplement their traditional diet of grains and vegetables, there has been a dramatic increase in intensive animal farming.

This sudden elongation of the food chain and the industrialization of food production have been accompanied by an explosion of health scares; the recent scandals of baby milk, chocolate, and eggs tainted by melamine are just the latest. Corruption has obstructed attempts to crack down on rogue food companies; in 2007, the former head of the State Food and Drug Administration was executed for taking bribes and dereliction of duty. Pollution is rife, with widespread contamination of farmland and irrigation water. A recent survey found that food safety was a major concern of the Chinese public.

Inevitably, there is a growing market for lü se shi pin, “green food products,” for which newly affluent consumers are willing to pay a premium. Some restaurants offer dishes made with “pollution-free” pork raised in Tibet or wild mushrooms from supposedly pristine forests. Specialist tea companies sell leaves from plantations that are purportedly far from the fallout of factory chimneys. But, with a rampant black market in fake products of every description, it is hard to know which claims to believe.

For Dai, the only solution was to cut out the middlemen and source his own ingredients from producers. “My family thought I was crazy, trying to buy everything from the countryside—my mother told me I’d go bankrupt!” he said. “Most of our farmers can’t supply us in any great quantity, so we have to buy from many different households. We have perhaps two hundred suppliers for vegetables alone. I don’t even know what the total number is, but I guess it must be three or four thousand.”

There is no main dining room at the Dragon Well Manor. Instead, it has eight private rooms, each with its own terrace, scattered in pavilions around the garden. They are furnished in the spare style of the Ming dynasty, with framed paintings and calligraphy on the walls. The restaurant is almost always fully booked, and each of its two daily seatings—lunch and dinner—can accommodate no more than eighty-eight people. The staff numbers just over a hundred: cooks, waitresses, buyers, administrators, gardeners, and runners to carry the covered dishes from kitchen to dining room. The restaurant has no à la carte menu: customers decide how much they want to spend and let the kitchens send out whatever is good that day.

“We have seventeen cooks,” Dai said. “In a normal restaurant, the same number would be expected to serve more than thirty tables. But although we are expensive by local standards, we are by no means at the top of the range. Our cheapest set menu works out at around three hundred yuan a head”—about forty-five dollars. “If people pay more, we will give them luxuries like the last baby chestnuts of the season. By now, we do manage to cover our running costs and our taxes, but I’ll never recoup my investment. But then I don’t do it for money. I’m content just to feed people who really appreciate what we do.”

Dai’s main worry is that traditional farming and cooking won’t survive another generation. During two weeks that I spent in Hangzhou, in two different seasons, I accompanied him on visits to half a dozen or so rural suppliers, and in almost every household the parents and grandparents were keeping up the family farms, while the children had left for the cities. One fisherman who provides most of the restaurant’s fish and shrimp quipped that his son was more interested in shang wang—surfing the Internet—than in san wang: casting a fishing net. The oldest supplier is ninety-three years old.

Dai sees himself as a custodian of traditional skills. “My senior chefs are all officially retired workers, but they are teaching the younger chefs how to cook without MSG,” he said. “And when this place was built I made sure that there were younger workers around who could learn from the old master craftsmen.” He dreams of one day opening a self-sustaining farm where schoolchildren can learn about the origins of what they eat. “In the past, everyone who grew up in the countryside knew how to raise pigs and fowl, and understood the old agricultural calendar,” he said. “But things have developed so quickly, and we are losing touch with our traditions.” Still, he is aware of the limitations of his project. “We can only do this on a small scale,” he told me as we finished our tea. “China has so many people, and so little land. If everyone tried to eat this way, there wouldn’t be enough food to go around. But we must try to sustain our agricultural lore and culinary skills for future generations.”

After our exertions in pursuit of wild kiwifruit that day, we returned to our guide Bao Laichun’s farmhouse. Dai and I sat at a table in the living room with his chief buyer, Zhou Guofu, who is also his maternal uncle. Bao handed cigarettes to all the men while his wife brought us green tea. It was an old-fashioned mud-brick farmhouse on the brink of a spectacular valley. Silk gourds hung amid yellow blossoms from a vine on the terrace, and water collected in a stone vat fed by a mountain stream. The family’s vegetable plot was a patchwork of crops: peanuts and soya, maize and rape. Bao’s work foraging for Dai supplements his income as a bamboo transporter. His wife runs a free-range-chicken farm, supplying eggs and birds to the restaurant’s kitchens.

“Sourcing our ingredients was a nightmare at first,” Zhou said. The buyers spent months driving out to remote villages, meeting farmers, and trying to set up a network of suppliers. They commissioned peasants to rear free-range chickens and ducks, to feed pigs a traditional diet of grain and vegetables, and to sow their fields according to the solar terms of the old agricultural calendar. Through word of mouth, they found people who were prepared to gather wild lily flowers, to catch paddy eels and turtles. “But we were groping in the dark,” Zhou said. “And sometimes the peasants deceived us, passing off factory-farmed pork as home-raised meat, or using chemicals on the sly.”

According to Dai, even his own buyers were at first so irritated by his stringent demands that they sometimes did their shopping in regular markets. He began to insist on visible proof that they’d really bought from peasant producers—a requirement that eventually gave rise to the photographs and contracts displayed in the restaurant’s purchase diary. Gradually, he persuaded his staff to take his project as seriously as he did, and they managed to iron out many of their early problems. “We learned to look for insect bites in our greens, a sign that they were free of pesticides, and to tell the difference between factory-farmed and farm-raised pork,” Zhou said, adding that relations with suppliers have become friendly. “We pay them a premium, so they are willing to give us what we want.”

We gathered around the table for lunch in the warm sunlight that streamed through the open front door of the farmhouse. Bao’s daughter brought out the dishes from the kitchen, one by one. The vegetables were all homegrown or foraged, and cooked in home-pressed rapeseed oil. There was water bamboo, stir-fried on a wood-burning stove with a little sliced pork and a dash of Shaoxing wine; pumpkin leaves with chili and garlic; celery with pressed bean curd; sesame greens, a wild vegetable with an herbal taste; sweetpotato stalks with chili and garlic; silk gourd with pork and chili; and a potful of guo ba fan, an old farmhouse favorite of steamed rice with a crisp golden crust.

I complimented our hosts and asked if this was the kind of food they normally ate. They assured me that it was, and Dai hooted with laughter. “What complete rubbish!” he said. “I know perfectly well you wouldn’t eat sweet-potato stalks and pumpkin leaves by choice! You’re only serving them to humor me.” He turned to me. “As far as they are concerned, this is just the stuff they feed to their animals! They are just too polite to say so—they don’t want to admit that they are serving pig food to their honored foreign guest.” He turned to Bao and his wife and asked, “Isn’t that true?”

The couple smiled with embarrassment and admitted that this was so. Everyone laughed. And later that afternoon, when we arrived at our next stop, to inspect a pig due for slaughter later in the week, the lady of the house was sitting on the kitchen floor, chopping up sweet-potato stalks for the doomed animal’s dinner.

On another day, I went to visit the Dragon Well Manor’s head chef, Dong Jinmu, a gruff-voiced man with thick eyebrows and a dry sense of humor. He began by giving me a tour of the kitchens. We watched two elderly brothers grind soybeans in a hand-turned mill, and then boil the soy milk in a wok over an old-fashioned wood-burning stove. According to Dong, when Dai opened the restaurant, he persuaded the men to move their entire village bean-curd workshop into his garden. Now they make fresh soy milk and bean curd every day. Dong himself had a hand in building their stove. “We sacrificed a large cockerel in the traditional way, cutting its head off and splashing blood over the site,” he told me.

It was early in the morning, and in the main kitchen younger chefs were cutting up vegetables and butchering pork. On either side, there were smaller rooms: one for making cold dishes, one for soups and stews, another for pressing fruit juices. In a prep room, shelves were stacked with entire Jinhua hams, as well as with huge winter melons, pumpkins, and an assortment of vegetables. Dried bamboo shoots soaked in a large basin on the floor. A little farther away, in an outbuilding open to the yard, several women were plucking and cleaning chickens.

Before coming to Dragon Well, Chef Dong worked for forty years at Louwailou, Hangzhou’s most famous restaurant. Dai approached him after his retirement, realizing that he would be a repository of disappearing recipes and skills, and also recruited two other retired chefs, Guo Ming and Yang Aiping. But even these three initially struggled with Dai’s rigorous approach to traditional methods. Dong thought that dispensing with MSG would be commercially disastrous, but Dai insisted, and Chef Dong started once again to make the rich stocks that his old shifu (master chef) had taught him during his apprentice years, in the nineteen-sixties.

As the lunchtime service started, Dong and Guo went to their wok stations. Guo was making soups and stir-fries that included peasant dishes like scrambled eggs with chives, while Dong took charge of red-braised dishes and banquet delicacies. “Taste a bit of this,” he said, handing me a sample of golden liquid from a bowl at his side. It was an elixir of dried scallops and chicken, their flavors marvellously distilled, that he uses to enhance and enrich his soups and sauces. And then he offered me a taste of a sauce in a simmering potful of red-braised fish tails, an astonishing wine-dark liquid. This is what people mean, I thought, when they say “depth of flavor.” The taste was like gazing into a deep, ancient pool.

In the early evening, I joined one of the restaurant’s reception staff, Qian Lu, on a terrace overlooking a pond, and we lay back on bamboo seats, sipping Dragon Well tea and eating nuts and dried fruits. Boulders had been strewn here and there with artful artlessness, and lotus leaves tilted drowsily in the water. At dusk, a woman had begun to play the guzheng, a large zither, under a canopy on a little island in the pond. The low hills of Longjing rose all around. Listening to the music, gazing out over the pond, and chatting with Qian Lu, who was wearing a pale silk qi pao embroidered with flowers, I felt that I had been transported into the world of the great eighteenth-century novel “Dream of the Red Chamber,” whose author, Cao Xueqin, was from the Lower Yangtze Region. Then Qian Lu took a call from Dai on her wristwatch cell phone. “These qi pao don’t have pockets, so we can’t carry normal cell phones,” she said.

At dinnertime, we joined Dai, his uncle Zhou, and some friends in one of the private dining rooms, a hall with wooden pillars supporting raftered ceilings. A large round table in the center of the room was laid with fine blue-and-white china, made to order in China’s ancient porcelain capital, Jingdezhen.

A waitress served us fresh warm soy milk, seasoned with soy sauce, preserved mustard tuber, pieces of deep-fried dough stick, paper-thin dried shrimp, and chopped scallion. It was the kind of dish that makes a Hangzhou person sigh. It’s rare, nowadays, to find such stone-ground soy milk. Even in the villages, people have discarded their old stone querns and use electric mills instead.

The meal began with a selection of appetizers: crisp young ginger, pickled in a sweet-sour marinade; slices of pressed bean curd made by the elderly brothers and bathed in a luxurious stock; the wild sesame greens we’d shared with Farmer Bao; tiny cucumbers, picked that morning, with a dip of sweet fermented sauce; crunchy jellyfish with local rice vinegar. Waitresses in qi pao and pearls poured us glasses of freshly pressed juice: yellow peach and wild kiwi, from the fruit we’d helped to gather.

There were echoes of dishes I had tasted at the restaurant earlier in the year, but much was different. Loquats, whose juice we had drunk in May, were no longer available, and the season for wild shrimp was past. And at the end of this, my second stay in Hangzhou, I realized that I really had seen the origins of much of what I ate. Our first main course was a stir-fry of tender chicken with tiny chestnuts, so young they were still crisp and yellow: visiting the farm where the chicken had been raised, I had been scratched by the bristles of wild chestnuts. There was red-braised belly pork with dried bamboo shoots, the meat as dark as molasses and so soft you could sink a chopstick into the flesh: I had heard the shrieks of the pig, seen its throat slit and its blood thunder into a basin, and tasted its flesh, poached in water, barely half an hour later. And in the fragrance of the dish was the memory of a Shaoxing wine factory where I had wandered among the stacked wine jars, sealed with lotus leaves and clay.

A waitress entered and laid a soup tureen on the table. She announced the dish as wu ming ying xiong—“nameless heroes.” Steam rose from a milky broth, in which a carp rested in the silky folds of bamboo-pith fungus. Scarlet wolfberries and sliced scallion were scattered on top, like jewels on pale flesh. The waitress ladled the soup into small bowls, each with a piece of fish and a lacy morsel of fungus. The liquid was xian, richly savory, replete with delicious fish flavors, and yet the fish itself was not overcooked. Dai explained that this was a gongfu cai, an “art” dish, whose elaborate preparation was invisible in the simplicity of its final appearance. Small crucian carp were used for the broth, simmered for their flavor and then discarded. The whole carp in front of us had been poached, briefly, in their stock. “So you see,” Dai said, “the vanished crucian carp are the dish’s ‘nameless heroes.’ ”

After the meal was over, I walked back through the garden, to the gate where Zhou, the buyer, was waiting to take me home. Fragments of conversation and laughter drifted from hidden terraces, and a few lights shone among the trees. I wandered over the stone bridges, through the shadows of willow and winter plum. Osmanthus trees were in bloom, and the night air was filled with their honeyed fragrance.

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Author: Fuchsia Dunlop
Original Source: New Yorker
Date Published: November 24, 2008
Web Source: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/11/24/081124fa_fact_dunlop?currentPage=1
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-29

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Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Reflections Of A Bridge Blogger

[At the 2008 Chinese Blogger Conference in Guangzhou, I was scheduled to give a talk. A family medical emergency forced me to cancel. The following is the talk that I would have given.]

I am honored to be a speaker at the 2008 Chinese Blogger Conference. Some of you here may know me very well, but it is likely that many of you do not know me at all. That is because I am a Chinese bridge blogger who writes in English. Rebecca MacKinnon wrote: "What is a bridge-blogger? Somebody who acts as a 'bridge' between their blogging community and the rest of the world." Since 2003, I have been making some parts of the Chinese Internet community (but obviously not all parts) known to the English-reading world at large. I would like to talk to you today about how things have changed in those five years as I see it.

I am interested in many different things in Greater China, including media fairness, mass incidents, rumor mongering, social hypocrisy, censorship, public opinion polls, earthquake prediction, nationalism, Eileen Chang (Zhang Ailing), fake photography, sexual mores, etc. But here today, I would like to concentrate on how the treatment of social incidents has changed over time. It tells a lot about what is happening in Chinese society as a whole.

Let me begin with a process model about a generic incident in the pre-Internet era.

1. A bad thing happens somewhere in China (such as police brutality, government malfeasance, a forced eviction, a coal mine disaster, etc).

2. The local government suppresses all information.

3. All media reports are censored. [If it wasn't reported, it didn't happen as far as people are concerned.]

4. The victims begin a petitioning process up the hierarchy in order to seek justice. The road is long and hard (see The Long Road To Petition) with dim prospects.

This model has been in existence in China since antiquity. The assumption is that the Emperor (President/Chairman/Premier) is benevolent, but is sometimes shielded from the truth by his corrupt underlings. If only the truth can be brought to his attention, justice will be rendered. If the Emperor fails to respond, then it is time for yet another rebellion to find another Son of Heaven to take his place.

The Internet showed up in China in the late 1990's with many bulletin board systems. By early 2002, personal blogs began to appear. How has that affected this process model? Here is the revised version around 2003 when I started my bridge blogging.

1. A bad thing happens somewhere in China (such as police brutality, government malfeasance, a forced eviction, a coal mine disaster, etc).

2. The local government suppresses all information.

3. All media reports are censored. [But if it wasn't reported in traditional media, there are other alternatives now on the Internet.]

4. The victims begin a petitioning process up the hierarchy in order to seek justice. The road is long and hard, and nothing ever comes out of it.

5. The Internet forums/blogs rushed to report on the case. But within approximately 48 hours, all traces of information are erased by order of the authorities. [Thus, one of the excitements of my blogging activity was to find and translate that information before this window closes.]

6. Western media catch wind of the incident, and follow through. This creates an international scandal.

7. Senior Chinese officials take notice, and corrective actions are taken.

Of course, it was never as simple as that. The reality is that western media have 'short attention span.' I am not denigrating the western media here. I am just stating the facts of life. First, compare how many 'injustices' occur every day in a country with 1.4 billion people and how much column space The New York Times or The Guardian can give to coverage on China? You can imagine how one incident must compete against all others for that single daily story in The New York Times or The Guardian. I observe that deaths (preferably documented by photographs) usually help. The core message is as the Chinese blogger Michael Anti once said, "If it isn't reported in English, it didn't happen." And that is really dismaying.

Secondly, how long and profound can that story be? The most typical setup is 800 words, with one paragraph for background, two paragraphs for the actual incident, one paragraph for one expert, one paragraph for another expert and one paragraph for the overall context (as in, "there were 87,000 mass incidents last year in China"). This is not going to generate international pressure in most cases. International pressure comes only when many media cover the same story for many days in a row. This is not an impossible mission, but people have to be very crafty and astute in presenting and positioning their case to the western media.

Nevertheless, I regarded my blog as a value-added service. If a English-language reader is intrigued by a English-language report on some 'atrocity' in China, he may be tempted to search for more information on the Internet. He will be able to find the full translation about the incident at my blog. For example, I provided in-depth coverage in early 2004 about the matter of The Chinese Peasant Study by Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao. There are many examples in my blog archive about other social incidents under this foreign interventionist model. In 2006, a survey of foreign correspondents by Rebecca Mackinnon found that my blog was the top blog as well as an important source of information. A number of Chinese bloggers have found that they were receiving international attention through my translations of their blog posts. That was how they found out about me.

But we are now in late 2008. How have things changed? I would revise the process model as follows:

1. A bad thing happens somewhere in China (such as police brutality, government malfeasance, a forced eviction, a coal mine disaster, etc).

2. The local government suppresses all information.

3. All media reports are censored.

4. The victims begin a petitioning process up the hierarchy in order to seek justice. The road is long and hard and nothing ever results.

5. The Internet forums/blogs rushed to report on the case.

6a. Within 48 hours, all traces of negative (i.e. against the authorities) information are erased by order of the authorities, or else by self-censorship at the portals/forums/blog service providers.

6b. Positive (i.e. on behalf of the authorities) information appear from Internet commentators who are paid by the authorities for their efforts.

5. Western media catch wind of the incident, and follow through with an international incident.

7. But there are just too many portals/forums/blogs that important information will eventually seep through.

8. Senior Chinese officials take notice, and corrective actions are taken.

So what are the most important changes over the past five years?

Firstly, the Internet has grown so big that it is beyond normal control. How do you monitor what 253 million netizens are doing (statistics from Wikipedia)? How do you monitor the contents on 11 million Chinese websites? The mythical 30,000 Internet police are helpless against those numbers. If there are banned subjects, they must run to thousands each week. How is any website supposed to implement the bans? It is humanly impossible. There is no well-defined, active system in place. Instead, there are only opportunistic, reactive systems that operate slowly and imperfectly. The dam is leaking all over the place.

Secondly, there is the emergence of an extremist right and an extremist left on the Internet in terms of public opinion. The characteristics of these two extremist wings are by no means clear. Generally speaking the extremist right might be the ones who claim to automatically embrace the universal values of freedom, liberty and human rights, and assumes that China is worhtless until those values are implemented. Conversely, the extremist left automatically embrace patriotism, nationalism and sovereignty, and assumes that China must defend itself from foreign intrusion at all cost. But that is very much an over-simplification of matters. It suffices that on any seemingly simple issue (such as Chang Ping's essay about how to find out the truth about the Lhasa incident), there exists two diametrically opposite viewpoints that are automated gainsays. They are vigorous, even vicious, but also uninformative and unpersuasive. Each viewpoint is likely to be held by a small number of netizens, but when the majority chooses to keep silent, this becomes much ado about nothing to read about these vitriolic Internet comments.

Thirdly, a more interesting development has been the artful insertion of rumors into public debates. On the seemingly straightforward case of The Police Beat A Harbin University Student To Death, there was a wave of misinformation about the deceased (that is, he had family ties to important government figures; he was a drug abuser; etc) that undermines public sympathy. This gets to the point where one has to tread extremely carefully in every case to tell information from misinformation. That may be frustrating, but it is actually very useful training. You might as well as learn about the art of lie detection in cases with lower social costs than in more important cases with huge consequences (such as elections).

Fourthly, and most importantly, you will note the role of western media has been eliminated from the process model. This means a lot to me, because I am a bridge blogger from China to the English-only readership. My base has just been driven into insignificance. If once upon a time western media coverage, which affects the opinion of western politicians and citizens, mattered to the Chinese people, this is no longer the case.

In the political realm, the Chinese people no longer have to believe in the rhetoric of freedom, liberty, democracy, sovereignty and human rights. The war in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison, the Guantanamo camp, hurricane Katrina and other misconduct took care of all that. Why would the Chinese people be interested in what American president George W. Bush have to preach to them about freedom, liberty, democracy, sovereignty and human rights? When the western media invoke those terms, the reaction from the Chinese people is: "Look within yourselves and fix your own problems first!"

In the economic realm, the financial tsunami of 2008 took care of any credibility in the Washington consensus. In its place was an as-yet-undefined Beijing consensus which has less specifics than the general idea of self-determination. Why would the Chinese people be interested in what Alan Greenspan and Henry Paulson have to tell them about how to run their economy when these 'wise men' only have failure on their hands?

In the media realm, the western media have taken a pounding in the eyes of the Chinese public this year. First, there was the western media coverage of the Tibet disturbances (see Chinese Netizens versus Western Media), followed by The Olympic Torch Tour As Public Relations Disaster. The list goes on and on. Why would the Chinese people be interested in western media coverage along the same lines?

So here is how I perceive my role to have changed in these last five years.

Five years ago, I had the missionary complex that I was going to help change China by getting the western media interested in certain matters and hence create international pressure. Maybe good things will occur as a result.

Today, I no longer have any sense of mission. Instead, I am a passive observer who is recording how the Chinese people are forging their own destinies by their own actions.

Here I am reminded of a stanza from T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets (Little Gidding):

There are three conditions which often look alike
Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow:
Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment
From self and from things and from persons; and, growing between them, indifference
Which resembles the others as death resembles life,
Being between two lives—unflowering, between
The live and the dead nettle. This is the use of memory:
For liberation—not less of love but expanding
Of love beyond desire, and so liberation
From the future as well as the past. Thus, love of a country
Begins as attachment to our own field of action
And comes to find that action of little importance
Though never indifferent. History may be servitude,
History may be freedom. See, now they vanish,
The faces and places, with the self which, as it could, loved them,
To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern.

Once upon a time, some people believed in the importance of western media reports. Other people held the opposite view and considered them demonic. But today, indifference has set in to replace the passions on either side. People in China no longer care what the western media have to say.

I don't have any sense of despair. Instead I am very optimistic. For the longest time, people have said that freedom/liberty/democracy/human rights and all that are not going to come to China through exterior imposition. I mean, is democracy going to come when the United States of America sends their Viceroy Paul Bremer to run China and bring prosperity in addition to freedom/liberty/democracy/human rights? NO! Instead, it must come from the Chinese people themselves. So why would I despair when this is happening here and now? I am just honored to be an observer in this moment of history.

[Postcript: At this 2008 Chinese Blogger Conference, there is a list of seventeen Chinese bloggers who represent how free thinking and an open media will affect the future of China:

安替
长平
连岳
时昭
胡咏
冯三七
周曙光
杨恒均
邓志新
艾未未
老虎庙
温云超
许志永
刘晓原
翟明磊
宋以朗
毛向辉

I don't know how I deserve this mention alongside them. I don't think that I belong here at all because I contribute practically nothing original. In any case, I am very much honored. This is how it is in the year 2008. In another five years' time, there will be many, many more of us. Our power will be due to the fact that we come in different shapes and forms, we have different beliefs and creeds, we have different concerns and foci, and we have different methods and styles. Together, we are the Chinese blogosphere.]

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How China can be more than 350 Albanias

It is a truth occasionally acknowledged that if you lay a map of China over one of the US, some striking similarities emerge. Their size is uncannily close, with both occupying almost exactly 6.5 per cent of the world's land mass. Their shapes are broadly similar, if you make allowances for Alaska. (That at least spares us a Chinese version of Sarah Palin.) Both have a rich eastern seaboard - the US has a rich western one too - and swathes of relatively underdeveloped hinterland. History has placed their most important city, Beijing and New York, in the top north-east corner, and their Mecca to Mickey Mouse, Hong Kong and Anaheim, in the south.

If you ask Chinese academics whether China has a role model, a surprising number point to the US. That country is the only one - leaving aside Russia - with the continental scale and oceans of ambition to match China's own. Even culturally, there are superficial similarities. Viewed from Japan, with an etiquette-laced culture that values craft above commerce, China looks like an American-style can-do nation where money is king.

But recent events have knocked China's confidence in - even respect for - its mentor. After years of preaching the virtues of the free market to Beijing, Washington has created a raft of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the wreckage of Wall Street. Its once mighty car industry, with brands every Chinese person once aspired to own, has been reduced to knocking on the door of politicians, begging bowl in hand. The next thing you know, Washington will be working on a five-year plan.

Of course, politically, the US's reputation has been temporarily salvaged by Barack Obama. His victory is seen in China as evidence of the extraordinary flexibility of US democracy, surprising those who thought Americans would never pick a black president.

But financially, America's glory days appear over. Chinese academics love telling the story (you would think they were all listening in on the call) of how George W. Bush begged Hu Jintao, China's president, to keep buying US bonds. China will keep on helping out, they say, though it knows the US will have to debase the dollar. "Only God can fix it and Obama is not God," says Shi Yinhong, professor of international politics at Renmin University. "If they print too much money, the financial basis of this empire will collapse."

China appears to hold all the cards. It has nearly $2,000bn (€1,570bn, £1,330bn) of reserves and a fashionably basic banking system that the state uses to funnel money to the real economy. (Are you watching Hank Paulson?) The government can spend an extra $586bn to keep growth ticking over at 8 per cent. (Ditto.) Francis Fukuyama, the academic, fresh from declaring the victory of liberal democracy, now suspects US hegemony is fading. He recently told Newsweek: "American power relative to the world is declining because of the growth of other centres of power."

Yet China is not acting as though its moment has arrived. Before last weekend's G20 summit, officials were almost diffident about Beijing's role in helping to design a new financial order. Referring to the presidents of France and Brazil, both of whom have seized on US weakness with greater alacrity, one official said: "We are happy to let [Nicolas] Sarkozy and [Luiz Inácio] Lula [da Silva] be in the headlines." Liu Lefei, chief investment officer of China Life, the world's largest life assurer, said China would be cautious about introducing derivatives, not because it held them in suspicion, but because it lacked expertise. In the military arena, too, officials are disarmingly humble, acknowledging the stabilising presence of the US Pacific Fleet and playing down any notion that China's navy wants to project power.

For such a big country, Beijing remains surprisingly nervous about what seem to be trivial disruptions, such as a trickle of North Korean refugees. Though it undoubtedly aspires to greater clout in an enlarged Group of Eight or a reformed International Monetary Fund, it appears worried about what that might entail. More visibility would, after all, bring its currency, environmental and foreign policies - to name a few - under closer scrutiny.

China's belief in its own Great Power status is real. But so is its lack of confidence. It is easy to stroll down Shanghai's Bund and be taken in by the sight of the splendid buildings and well-dressed nouveaux Chinese sipping their green-tea lattes and hollering into their slimline mobile phones. But Shanghai is not China. And even most of Shanghai is not like the Bund.

The power and energy on display in emerging Chinese cities can be so impressive it is easy to forget that China's per capita output is less than Albania's. In purchasing power parity terms, at $5,325, China comes in 100th place, four slots behind Albania.

Of course China, with its 1.3bn people, has an economy vastly bigger - roughly 350 times bigger, in fact - than its east European cousin. Scale does matter. But, until China chooses to act like the sum of its parts, it might be more useful to think of it as 350 Albanias than as one America.

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Author: David Pilling
Original Source: Financial Times
Date Published: Wednesday Nov 19 2008
Web Source: http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto111920081415033115&page=1
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-03

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India Calling

VERLA, India

“WHAT are Papa and I doing here?”

These words, instant-messaged by my mother in a suburb of Washington, D.C., whizzed through the deep-ocean cables and came to me in the village where I’m now living, in the country that she left.

It was five years ago that I left America to come live and work in India. Now, in our family and among our Indian-American friends, other children of immigrants are exploring motherland opportunities. As economies convulse in the West and jobs dry up, the idea is spreading virally in émigré homes.

Which raises a heart-stirring question: If our parents left India and trudged westward for us, if they manufactured from scratch a new life there for us, if they slogged, saved, sacrificed to make our lives lighter than theirs, then what does it mean when we choose to migrate to the place they forsook?

If we are here, what are they doing there?

They came of age in the 1970s, when the “there” seemed paved with possibility and the “here” seemed paved with potholes. As a young trainee, my father felt frustrated in companies that awarded roles based on age, not achievement. He looked at his bosses, 20 years ahead of him in line, and concluded that he didn’t want to spend his life becoming them.

My parents married in India and then embarked to America on a lonely, thrilling adventure. They learned together to drive, shop in malls, paint a house. They decided who and how to be. They kept reinventing themselves, discarding the invention, starting anew. My father became a management consultant, an entrepreneur, a human-resources executive, then a Ph.D. candidate. My mother began as a homemaker, learned ceramics, became a ceramics teacher and then the head of the art department at one of Washington’s best schools.

It was extraordinary, and ordinary: This is what America did to people, what it always has done.

My parents brought us to India every few years as children. I relished time with relatives; but India always felt alien, impenetrable, frozen.

Perhaps it was the survivalism born of scarcity: the fierce pushing to get off the plane, the miserliness even of the rich, the obsession with doctors and engineers and the neglect of all others. Perhaps it was the bureaucracy, the need to know someone to do anything. Or the culture shock of servitude: a child’s horror at reading “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” in an American middle school, then seeing servants slapped and degraded in India.

My firsthand impression of India seemed to confirm the rearview immigrant myth of it: a land of impossibilities. But history bends and swerves, and sometimes swivels fully around.

India, having fruitlessly pursued command economics, tried something new: It liberalized, privatized, globalized. The economy boomed, and hope began to course through towns and villages shackled by fatalism and low expectations.

America, meanwhile, floundered. In a blink of history came 9/11, outsourcing, Afghanistan, Iraq, Katrina, rising economies, rogue nuclear nations, climate change, dwindling oil, a financial crisis.

Pessimism crept into the sunniest nation. A vast majority saw America going astray. Books heralded a “Post-American World.” Even in the wake of a historic presidential election, culminating in a dramatic change in direction, it remained unclear whether the United States could be delivered from its woes any time soon.

“In the U.S., there’s a crisis of confidence,” said Nandan Nilekani, co-chairman of Infosys Technologies, the Indian software giant. “In India,” he added, “for the first time after decades or centuries, there is a sense of optimism about the future, a sense that our children’s futures can be better than ours if we try hard enough.”

My love for the country of my birth has never flickered. But these new times piqued interest in my ancestral land. Many of us, the stepchildren of India, felt its change of spirit, felt the gravitational force of condensed hope. And we came.

Exact data on émigrés working in India or spending more time here are scarce. But this is one indicator: India unveiled an Overseas Citizen of India card in 2006, offering foreign citizens of Indian origin visa-free entry for life and making it easier to work in the country. By this July, more than 280,000 émigrés had signed up, according to The Economic Times, a business daily, including 120,000 from the United States.

At first we felt confused by India’s formalities and hierarchies, by British phraseology even the British had jettisoned, by the ubiquity of acronyms. We wondered what newspapers meant when they said, “INSAT-4CR in orbit, DTH to get a boost.” (Apparently, it meant a satellite would soon beam direct-to-home television signals.)

Working in offices, some of us were perplexed to be invited to “S&M conferences,” only to discover that this denoted sales and marketing. Several found to their chagrin that it is acceptable for another man to touch your inner thigh when you crack a joke in a meeting.

We learned new expressions: “He is on tour” (Means: He is traveling. Doesn’t mean: He has joined U2.); “What is your native place?” (Means: Where did your ancestors live? Doesn’t mean: What hospital delivered you?); “Two minutes” (Means: An hour. Doesn’t mean: Two minutes.).

We tried to reinvent ourselves, as our parents had, but in reverse. Some studied Hindi, others yoga. Some visited the Ganges to find themselves; others tried days-long meditations.

Many of us who shunned Indian clothes in youth began wearing kurtas and chappals, saris and churidars. There was a sad truth in this: We had waited for our heritage to become cool to the world before we draped its colors and textures on our own backs.

We learned how to make friends here, and that it requires befriending families. We learned to love here: Men found fondness for the elusive Indian woman; women surprised themselves in succumbing to chauvinistic, mother-spoiled men.

We forged dual-use accents. We spoke in foreign accents by default. But when it came to arguing with accountants or ordering takeout kebabs, we went sing-song Indian.

We gravitated to work specially suited to us. If there is a creative class, in Richard Florida’s phrase, there is also emerging what might be called a fusion class: people positioned to mediate among the multiple societies that claim them.

India’s second-generation returnees have built boutiques that fuse Indian fabrics with Western cuts, founded companies that train a generation to work in Western companies, become dealmakers in investment firms that speak equally to Wall Street and Dalal Street, mixed albums that combine throbbing tabla with Western melodies.

Our parents’ generation helped India from afar. They sent money, advised charities, guided hedge-fund dollars into the Bombay Stock Exchange. But most were too implicated in India to return. Our generation, unscathed by it, was freer to embrace it.

Countries like India once fretted about a “brain drain.” We are learning now that “brain circulation,” as some call it, may be more apt.

India did not export brains; it invested them. It sent millions away. In the freedom of new soil, they flowered. They seeded a new generation that, having blossomed, did what humans have always done: chase the frontier of the future.

Which just happened, for many of us, to be the frontier of our own pasts.



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Author: ANAND GIRIDHARADAS
Original Source: New York Times
Date Published: November 23, 2008
Web Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/weekinreview/23anand.html
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-26

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A brave new world awaits

WASHINGTON - If nothing else, the latest report of the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) makes a prophet of Kishore Mahbubani. His book, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East published at the beginning of the year foreshadowed one of the main conclusions of the NIC report released last week. (See Asia pushes, West resists, Asia Times Online, April 19, 2008.)

Among the assessments of the report, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, is that "the unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now underway will continue for the foreseeable future".

This projection coincides with US president-elect Barack Obama's announcement of an economic team with deep experience of managing international economic crises in the past decade. His string of appointees, including Timothy Geithner as Treasury secretary, may be a strong indication of Obama's awareness of the changing world - as well as how he intends to govern.

Geithner, appointed just days after the release of the Global Trends reports, worked previously at the International Monetary Fund, and was under secretary of the Treasury for international affairs during the administration of Bill Clinton, where he played a key role in dealing with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8.

Global Trends is the fourth unclassified report prepared by the NIC in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. Like previous reports, it was prepared to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact.

Like the old Chinese curse, the not-so-far-distant future looks to be a very interesting time, with both opportunities and perils. And the Asian region is going to be a very big part of it.

Among the report's "relative certainties" is that "a global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India and others". Similarly, among the key "uncertainties" are:
# Whether advances toward democracy occur in China and Russia.
# Whether regional fears about a nuclear-armed Iran trigger an arms race and greater militarization.
# Whether the greater Middle East becomes more stable, especially whether Iraq stabilizes, and whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved peacefully.
# Whether Europe and Japan overcome economic and social challenges caused or compounded by demography.

If the report is correct, the world finds itself in the midst of a transition to a place where the political and economic structure will be markedly different. The report finds that the "international system - as constructed following World War II - will be almost unrecognizable by 2025, owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries."

And therein lies a danger. The report notes that historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. While it doesn't predict the destruction of the international order, like the one that led to World War I, it does not rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion and military rivalries.

Economically, in the future when Asia speaks the world will attentively listen. Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries) indicate they will collectively match the original Group of Seven's share of global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2040-2050.

Asia will also be the region producing the major share of the future middle class. Over the next several decades, the number of people considered to be in the "global middle class" is projected to swell from 440 million to 1.2 billion - or from 7.6% of the world's population to 16.1%, according to the World Bank. Most of the new entrants will come from China and India.

In a sense, China and India are restoring the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30% and India 15% of the world’s wealth.

China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world's second largest economy. Both China and India's gross national product (GNP) is expected to exceed that of the US in 2035, but they will continue to lag in per capita income for decades.

But it will not be an Adam Smith-type economy. Generally, China, India and Russia are not following the West's liberal model for self-development, but instead are using a different model, "state capitalism"; the system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state.

And, if demography is destiny, Asia will also be where the future lies. World population is projected to grow by about 1.2 billion between 2009 and 2025, from 6.8 billion to around 8 billion people. Demographers project that Asia and Africa will account for most of the population growth until 2025, while less than 3% of the growth will occur in the "West".

The largest increase will occur in India, representing about one-fifth of all growth. India's population is projected to climb by around 240 million by 2025, reaching approximately 1.45 billion people. From 2009 to 2025, China, is projected to add more than 100 million to its current population of over 1.3 billion.

That is not to say there won't be problems. Around 2015, the size of China's working-age population will start to decline. The onset of larger proportions of retirees and relatively fewer workers is being accelerated by decades of policies that have limited childbirth and by a tradition of early retirement. By opting to slow population growth dramatically to dampen growing demand for energy, water and food, China is hastening the aging of its population.

By 2025, a large proportion of China's population will be retired or entering retirement. About the same time, due to growth in India's densely populated northern states, its population is projected to overtake China's.

Asia is also projected to be the region where various conflicts might erupt. The report states that over the next 15-20 years, reactions to the decisions Iran makes about its nuclear program could cause a number of regional states to intensify these efforts and consider actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

On the plus side, the report says, "We see a unified Korea as likely by 2025 - if not as a unitary state, than in some form of North-South confederation."

In this future world the United States will find itself as just one of a number of important actors on the world stage, albeit still the most powerful military nation. But advances by others states in science and technology, expanded adoption of irregular warfare tactics by both state and non-state actors, and proliferation of long-range precision weapons, and growing use of cyber warfare attacks increasingly will constrict US freedom of action.

This constrained US role raises questions about how effectively new agenda issues will be addressed. Despite the recent rise in anti-Americanism - which the report now thinks is beginning to wane somewhat - the US probably will continue to be seen as a much-needed regional balancer in the Middle East and Asia.

Other countries still expect the United States to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism or provide leadership on climate change. Yet the future proliferation of influential actors and distrust of vast power mean less room for the US to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships.

Thus Barack Obama and future US presidents will need to be doing a lot of talking with other national leaders in the future.

David Isenberg is an analyst in national and international security affairs, sento@earthlink.net. He is also a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a research fellow at the Independent Institute, and a US Navy veteran. The views expressed are his own.

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Author: David Isenberg
Original Source: Asia Times
Date Published: Nov 26, 2008
Web Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JK26Ak01.html
Date Accessed Online: 2008-11-26

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